Decision Analysis: Filling the Doctrinal Void in Applying the Effects-Based Approach to Operations (Paperback)

The U.S. military has considered effects in its operations for several decades, but has not been able to realize fully the utility of the outcomes. Commanders have reflected on their operational decisions, but they have not been able to learn quickly enough to reapply the findings to the current operation. Airpower doctrine has grown from choosing targets because of the commander's desired effect, to incorporating a systems approach to the adversary before generating a course of action. Commanders must be able to perform decision analysis whether the decision produced desired or undesired effects. Commanders and planners must examine the effects for their meaning within the strategic context. Current airpower doctrine does not emphasize decision analysis, a key concept to learning faster than the adversary. In order for decision analysis to be effective, planners must understand the complete system, friendly and rival. The paper examines the effects-based approach to joint operations (EBAO) and systemic operational design (SOD). Each approach emphasizes the requirement for a holistic view, but frames the problem differently. By combining the approaches, the joint force commander will have the tools necessary to perform decision analysis and guide the adversary system towards the desired strategic end-state. The research employs Operation ALLIED FORCE and its JFACC, LtGen Michael Short, to detail these concepts by applying EBAO and SOD to the historical context.