Surfing the First and Second Waves in 2025: A Sof Strategy for Regional Engagement (Paperback)

The United States is riding high on the crest of "third-wave" technology as it leads the world's rush into the Information Age. It must not become so fixated on the information-based future that it is unprepared to deal with 78 percent of the world's population who will still be living in pre-industrial and industrial societies late into the 21st Century. Our thesis is that Special Operations Regional Engagement (SORE) forces will be the United States' warriors prepared to successfully engage in these less developed, though no less threatening worlds of the first- and second-wave..."the 'Niche Warriors' of 2025." Their timeless core competencies--political sensitivity, specialized information, unorthodox approaches, unconventional training and equipment, and limited opportunity--make them special and distinguish them from conventional forces. These core competencies underlie SORE unique and specialized skills that make them the force of choice to meet this challenge. First, they possess the cross-cultural skills that will remain elusive for many, but are needed to build and gain the trust of these underdeveloped nations--foreign language proficiency, cultural and area awareness, non-verbal communications, and interpersonal skills. Second, they "blend" into the environments in which they operate, either using their cross-cultural skills or the new "third-wave" technologies at their disposal. Third, SORE forces are not employed to "fight the client's battle," but to train them to "defend themselves" without developing a dependency on SORE forces. There is a critical air power component to SORE that the Air Force must prepare itself to meet. Many first- and second-wave entities will face threats to their internal security that require the proper use of air power. The fledgling air forces of these entities will require assistance in developing adequate tactics, procedures, maintenance, supply, and other support systems within their own technological limitati
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