This study investigates the US Army after the end of the Cold War, specifically how the "Victory Disease" resulting from winning the Cold War caused complacency in the US Army which eventually led to the development of a flawed operational concept. This operational concept and its effects on the US Army are examined with respect to recent developments in US Army doctrine, weapons procurement, and force structure. The US Army is compared to the Israeli Army between 1967 and 1973 to draw very interesting and close parallels concerning how the victory disease affected the Israeli Army after its victory over the Arab allies in 1967 and how complacency in the post-1967 Israeli Army also led to a flawed operational concept, which, in turn, resulted in vulnerabilities that Israel's enemies were able to capitalize on at the onset of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. This study explains how fundamental shifts in how armies prepare for future conflicts can cause vulnerabilities that an enemy can exploit.
