Tanks in the Street: Lessons Learned Through Bytes Not Blood, (Paperback)

In December 1994 Russian armored forces assaulted Grozny, Chechnya in an attempt to subdue armed opposition groups seeking independence. Within twenty-four hours of urban combat the Chechens destroyed two brigade-sized units while suffering minimal casualties. Analysts speculate that fundamental errors committed by Russian forces caused the uneven battle. They determined the Russians committed poorly trained and improperly organized armored forces into an urban environment. Are those subjective assessments correct? One way to test those conclusions is through simulation. Through a controlled set of computer simulations it was possible to test the evaluations made by the analysts. Important elements of the urban battle are replicated using commercial software. After developing a suitable control scenario of the initial battle, a number of factors were examined by varying the settings in the simulation. The results from the different iterations provide evidence that confirms many of the analysts' observations. The Russians might have been successful in their initial assault into Grozny had they employed properly trained and organized forces for urban combat. Armored forces can play a significant role in successful urban combat operations. The US Army is currently revising their doctrine concerning the application of armored forces in urban terrain. Since doctrine is best derived from experience it is useful to examine a very difficult contemporary example of armor operations in a city and from that example begin to develop concepts for mounted combat in an urban environment.